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ABSTRACT 
 
In Chapter 1, the staggered nature of the adoption of interstate bank branching deregulation in the 
United States is utilized as an exogeneous shock to investigate the managerial incentives involved 
in corporate socially responsible (CSR) activities. Using Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Research 
& Analytics, Inc. for our CSR measures, we find a significant negative relation between the extent 
of deregulation and CSR practices, which implies that deregulation-led rising competition in 
product market makes the non-financial firms more concerned about protecting interests of 
shareholders than other stakeholders. Specifically, firms with low pricing power tend to 
significantly reduce their CSR activities. Our results are robust using alternative empirical 
specifications and CSR measures.  
 
Chapter 2 investigates the interaction between price stability and financial stability for “Fragile 
Five” countries. In the first step, we investigate the causation linkage between price stability and 
financial stability indicators. In the second step, we analyze the effect of financial stability 
instruments, lending rate and required reserve ratio, on price stability. We then test the price 
stability instrument policy rate on financial stability. Empirical findings, in the first step, indicate 
that there is no meaningful relationship between policy objectives in the short run, while the 
relation between financial stability and price stability occurs in the longer time frequencies. 
However, the situation is not valid for all economies. In the second step, we measure the effects 
of monetary policy tools employed by the central bank of each of the Fragile Five countries. The 
findings from the analysis that investigates the effects of each policy instrument imply that the 
policy rate instrument implemented to achieve the inflation target does not affect the financial 
stability goal. Similarly, the reserve requirement ratio instrument to achieve the financial stability 
viii 
 
goal does not affect the price stability goal. On the other hand, results give some implication about 
the negative effects of the lending rate instrument on the inflation targeting objective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Bank Deregulation, Product Market Competition, 
Financial Stability, Price Stability, Fragile Five, Schwartz Hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1. Credit Supply and Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Introduction  
U.S. bank deregulation, which occurred mainly from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s to 
remove the geographic expansion restrictions of banks within and across state lines, significantly 
affects the real economy. According to literature on the topic, there is evidence that deregulation 
increases the efficiency of the banking sector, lowers the cost of loans (Jayaratne and Strahan, 
1998), encourages entrepreneurship and creative destruction in non-financial industry (Black and 
Strahan, 2002; Kerr and Nanda, 2009), increases the supply of credit and entry of new firms 
(Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006), and leads to more innovation (Amore, 2013). While deregulation 
profoundly changes the operating environment of the companies, how it affects corporate socially 
responsible (henceforth, CSR) activities of non-financial firms is an unexplored but important 
question. We address this issue in this paper.  
 CSR has recently become an important part of corporate practices in dealing with 
stakeholders. An increasing number of firms have become involved in social responsible activities 
by making available a sizable portion of corporate resources to cater to stakeholders even though 
it is not legally required. There are two opposing views regarding the merits of CSR activities. The 
classical view in finance suggests that the main objective of a firm should be maximizing the value 
of shareholders (Friedman, 1970), and therefore, any social responsible activities that cater to other 
stakeholders would lead to a reduction of shareholders’ wealth (e.g., Vance 1975; Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009). The opposing literature that favors CSR activities claims that 
CSR helps the firms build a reputation of quality stakeholder management, and consequently (e.g., 
Coase, 1937; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987), an increased long-term profitability (Freeman et al., 
2004; Jensen, 2010). Exploring how bank deregulation might affect CSR, considering these views, 
is an empirical question. 
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 Based on findings of relevant studies, we predict that bank deregulation would significantly 
decrease CSR activities of non-financial firms. First, since deregulation makes the credit market 
more accessible to non-financial firms, which leads to a more innovative and competitive product 
market with a higher threat of entry of rivals, firms would be more concerned about protecting 
shareholders’ interests such as facing the threat of intense competition. Consequently, firms would 
be more likely to reduce their expenditure in activities related to the interests of non-shareholder 
stakeholders.1 Second, deregulation, in fact, leads the banks to compete by making loans more 
affordable to existing and potential future clients. As a result, the incentive of non-financial firms 
to use CSR as a signal of quality stakeholder management to the creditors (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2014) will be lessened.  Third, since CSR is a very costly 
strategy and requires a long-term window to generate meaningful returns, firms would be more 
inclined to reduce their involvement in CSR due to the immediate threat of increased competition 
in the product market brought on by a greater supply of credit. 
 However, empirically testing CSR activities is a challenging task because of possible 
endogeneity issues (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2010, Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012). In 
papers that look at the effects of CSR on profitability, the issue was the challenge of determining 
whether CSR causes increased profitability or was it the increased profitability that causes the firms 
to be steered toward more CSR investments. Furthermore, both CSR and firm profitability can be 
influenced by variables that could have been omitted from a model.  
                                                          
1 Related to this argument, Fresard and Valta (2015) show that as a consequence of increased product market 
competition from the reduction of import tariffs, incumbent firms tend to significantly reduce their overall investments.  
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Employing bank deregulation events as an exogenous shock to both firm performance and CSR 
investments in the empirical setting allowed the studies to overcome the challenging task of finding 
out how CSR is influenced.2  
The U.S. Congress passed the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency ACT (IBBEA) 
in 1994. The act made interstate branching across the U.S. legal beginning in 1997. The timing of 
the banking deregulation by states was irregular and unpredictable, which makes it possible to use 
deregulation as an exogeneous shock to the financial constraints faced by the non-financial firms 
and the resulting practices of CSR in this study. Following Krishnan (2014)’s adjustment of Rice 
and Strahan (2010), we use a Deregulation Index as our primary measure of deregulation.  
We obtain data on a firm’s CSR performance from the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. 
(hereafter, KLD) STATS database. KLD rates U.S. companies based on seven broad categories of 
CSR practices that are used as the most comprehensive measure of CSR in the literature. We focus 
on five categories: Employee, Corporate Governance, Community, Environment, and Product 
Quality. For each category, KLD provides a score of strengths which refer to positive actions taken 
and of concerns which refer to negative actions taken. We use net score, the difference between 
strengths and concerns, as our primary measure of CSR.  
 In our empirical test, we use a sample of 14,037 observations with 4,792 unique firms for 
the period of 1991-2005. Confirming our prediction, we find that interstate branch deregulation 
significantly affects CSR practices of firms headquartered in the deregulated states. In our analyses 
on each category performed separately, we find that all categories of CSR, except environment, 
                                                          
2 Some of the papers that took a similar approach of employing exogeneous shocks in finding out the determinants of 
CSR: Flammer (2015) uses reduction in import tariffs as an exogeneous variation to competition; Hong et al. (2012) 
use 1990s’ internet bubble as an exogeneous shock to financial constraints; Masulis and Reza (2014) use 2003 dividend 
tax cut as a shock to managerial ownership. Each of these exogeneous shocks were employed in the empirical setting 
of testing socially responsible activities.  
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experience significant downward movement in response to the increase of the level of deregulation. 
Furthermore, for each category, we separately test strengths and concerns of CSR practices. If net 
score, measured as the difference between strengths and concerns, of CSR decreases, then we can 
predict to find a negative relation of strengths but a positive relation of concerns with deregulation. 
Three categories of which strengths are significantly and negatively related with deregulation are: 
Community, Environment, and Product Quality. On the other hand, we find that the concerns of 
Employee, Corporate Governance, Community, and Product Quality are significantly and 
positively related with deregulation.  
 Even though, on average, all firms in the sample experience significant reduction in CSR 
practices following deregulation, we argue that such reversal in the practices should be severe for 
the firms operating in a competitive environment. For an additional test, using the median pricing 
power in each industry as the benchmark, we divide the sample into the group of firms with low 
pricing power and the group of firms with high pricing power. We follow the methodology of 
Peress (2010) to measure the pricing power of each firm. We also construct a subsample of firms 
in industries with low profit margin, and a subsample of firms in industries with high profit margin. 
In our empirical test, we find a significantly negative relation between CSR practices and the 
interaction term of Deregulation Index and the dummy variable for low pricing power. This 
negative relationship turns out to have more statistical and economic significance for the subsample 
of firms operating in high profit margin industries.  
 In a further robustness test, we create separate dummy variables for each deregulation score. 
In the index, a higher score indicates more deregulation, where “five” as the highest score indicates 
the states as the most open to allowing interstate branching. We find that dummy variables 
capturing deregulation scores as 5, 4, 3, and 2 have a significantly negative relation with CSR 
activities. Not surprisingly, the dummy variable for the lowest level of deregulation shows a 
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positive relation with CSR practices. Finally, our results persist in the presence of the use of 
alternative way of calculating net CSR score.  
 Our results contribute to the literature in the areas of CSR, bank deregulation, and product 
market competition. First, most of the existing empirical papers in CSR focus on leadership, or 
firm-specific factors in explaining CSR practices (e.g., Johnson and Greening, 1999; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2000; Marquis and Lee, 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; 
Tang et al., 2015). Among the very few studies that use shock in external environment as an 
exogenous catalyst of CSR (e.g., Hong et al., 2012; Masulis and Reza, 2014; Adhikari, 2016), ours 
is the first one to employ bank deregulation as an exogeneous shock in determining the CSR 
practices of non-financial firms.  
Second, while existing literature comprehensively covers how U.S. bank deregulation 
affects real economic activities and policies (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan,1996, 1998; Kerr and 
Nanda, 2009; Rice and Strahan, 2010; Amore et al., 2013), there is, to the authors’ best knowledge 
to date, no paper that examines the deregulation effect on CSR of non-financial firms. Our results 
that interstate branch deregulation leads to a significant reduction of CSR activities imply that as a 
result of greater credit supply at a lower cost, the incumbent firms tend to reduce their expenditures 
in CSR activities and focus more on the interests of shareholders to compete with better financed 
rival firms.  
Third, since deregulation leads to increased product market competition, and thereby affects 
managerial incentives of CSR activities, our paper contributes to the literature concerning product 
market competition. Related to our paper, Flammer (2014) shows how increased product market 
competition resulting from the reduction of tariffs affects CSR. Our paper significantly departs 
from that paper in multiple aspects. Flammer’s paper focuses on tariff reduction and finds that firms 
employ more CSR activities in response to the increase in competition, as CSR helps domestic 
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companies differentiate their products from foreign rivals. While tariff reduction usually invites 
competition from existing foreign firms, bank deregulation leads to an increased level of product 
market competition arising mainly from existing domestic firms and an increased threat of entry of 
potential firms. Thereby, our measure of exogeneous shock to market competition, bank 
deregulation as the removal of financial barriers rather than tariff reduction as the removal of trade 
barrier, creates a different context. Furthermore, contrary to Flammer’s findings, we find a 
significant reduction in CSR activities, supporting the view of shareholder value maximization.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses background literature and 
presents the hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the results from empirical findings. Section 4 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background and hypothesis 
2.1. Why do companies engage in CSR activities? 
Existing literature offers two opposing views on why firms might employ CSR activities. 
We consider the arguments against CSR activities as the shareholder expense view, which suggests 
that shareholders lose value from socially responsible initiatives. Essentially, the classical view in 
finance suggests that corporations are responsible only for maximizing shareholders’ value and are 
not responsible to serve other stakeholders’ interests or improving the welfare of the society unless 
they are obliged by contracts (Friedman, 1970; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). Literature, based on 
this argument, considers CSR as an unnecessary cost that could possibly create disadvantages for 
the firms when comparing them to their competitors that don’t invest in CSR activities (e.g., 
Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2010). Moreover, some studies argue that CSR could become an agency 
problem whereby managers could utilize CSR to benefit themselves instead of shareholders (e.g., 
Brammer and Millington, 2008).  
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Studies suggest that even though it is true that socially responsible activities could help 
other stakeholders, the benefit occurs at the expense of shareholders (Vance 1975; Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009). For instance, if a firm adopts a socially responsible employee-
friendly policy which is not adopted as a practice by its competitors, it may put itself in a 
disadvantageous competitive position by incurring more costs from resources being spent on 
activities that don’t generate profits. As a result, the firm would be more likely to experience a 
decline in its profitability, at least in the short run. CSR, as a strategy, is very costly (Freeman, 
1984) and would require a long-term time frame to generate suitable financial benefits (Berman et 
al., 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001). Thus, at least in the short-term CSR could turn out to be a 
costly strategy. In fact, evidence from many studies suggest that CSR might deteriorate the short-
term market value of a firm (e.g., Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014).  
Paradoxically, in practice, corporations often venture outside the boundaries of profit 
maximization by getting involved in activities that serve the welfare of other stakeholders. For 
example, corporations tend to offer employee benefits, adopt environment-friendly production 
technologies, provide community services, etc. These practices fall in line with the stakeholder 
value maximization view, which suggests that CSR, in fact, increases firm value. More specifically, 
it argues that CSR activities incentivize the stakeholders to support firm operations by serving their 
interests, and thereby increase firm value. This view is largely supported by the theory of the firm 
and contract theory (Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Cornell 
and Shapiro, 1987). These theories argue that a firm stands upon contracts made between 
shareholders and other stakeholders, where each group of stakeholders provides much needed 
support or resources to the firms in exchange for claims in explicit contracts, such as wage 
contracts, and claims in implicit contracts, such as employee job security. Since the violation of 
implicit contracts does not imply legal violations, firms that honor implicit contracts tend to 
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enhance their reputation related to commitments to stakeholders, which leads to long-term benefits. 
Finally, high CSR firms are more likely to serve the interests of both shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and commit to firms’ long-term value (Freeman et al., 2004; Jensen, 2010).3  
 
2.2. Bank deregulation and CSR activities 
 Historically, the geographic outreach of U.S. banking activities within the U.S. has been 
constrained by several laws including the McFadden Act of 1927 and the Douglas Amendment to 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. During the period of 1970-1990s, the U.S. started to 
allow the geographic expansion of the banks within and across states at different phases. Evidence 
in literature shows that deregulation of banking activities significantly affects real economic 
activities. For example, bank deregulation increases the rates of per capital income growth and 
output (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996), increases bank efficiency and lowers the cost of loans 
(Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998), promotes entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan, 2002), allows more 
entry of firms and increases credit supply (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006), encourages creative 
destruction in nonfinancial industry (Kerr and Nanda, 2009), and increases innovation activities 
(e.g., Amore et al., 2013).  
 Considering the significant impact of deregulation on the non-financial industry, how such 
deregulation might affect the corporate policy of CSR activities is an empirical question. It is 
evident from the literature as discussed above that bank deregulation significantly increases 
competition in the product market. Greater access to external credit market at a lower cost is likely 
                                                          
3 Related to this argument, CSR helps firms differentiate themselves in the product market and provides a signal about 
their long-term strategy. For example, evidence from a number of empirical papers suggests that CSR initiatives 
enhance firm value by building loyalty and reputation among the stakeholders (e.g., List, 2006; Elfenbein et al., 2012; 
Servaes and Tamayo, 2014).  
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to increase entry of new firms, as well as make the rival firms more competitive. Since CSR has 
become an important and influential corporate policy in the recent decades, any significant change 
in product market could lead to a significant change in CSR activities. In response to more 
competition, firms can react in one of two ways; either devote more resources to CSR activities, or 
decrease investment in CSR activities.  
 There are a number of consequences of bank deregulation, which are closely related to the 
product market that can incentivize the firms headquartered in deregulated states to significantly 
cut down their expenditure on CSR activities. First, bank deregulation increases competition in the 
product market by making the debt market more accessible to rival firms (e.g., Black and Strahan, 
2002 Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). Specifically, through the force of creative destruction in non-
financial industry (Kerr and Nanda, 2009) firms struggling with financial constraints but having 
the potential to compete would likely to be more competitive if armed with a greater supply of 
affordable credit.  As a result, firms facing severe threats of competition would likely be more 
concerned about protecting the interests of shareholders than protecting the interests of other 
stakeholders.  
Second, bank deregulation might lower the managerial incentives of using CSR as a signal 
of better stakeholder management to the debt market. Prior evidence suggests that involvement in 
CSR activities might help firms achieve a lower cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et 
al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2014). These studies argue that since CSR decreases information asymmetry 
and provides a signal of strong commitment to serving stakeholders’ interests, external capital 
providers would consider the socially responsible firms as less risky and eventually would offer 
capital at a low cost to these firms. On the other hand, since following deregulation the banks 
compete by offering credit at low costs, firms can get access to the credit market with relatively 
less effort in the presence of a greater supply of credit. Consequently, firms would have less 
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pressure in attaining capital and thereby a decreased level of incentive to use CSR as a signal of 
better stakeholder management to the creditors.   
 Third, even if we consider the argument based on stakeholder management view that CSR 
helps a firm stand out from the rivals by showing its loyalty to other stakeholders, in the short run 
CSR as a strategy is very costly (Freeman, 1984; Berman et al., 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001). 
Specifically, the increased level of competition following bank deregulation would likely create an 
immediacy among firms to compete with each other by adopting more short-term oriented 
strategies and by cutting expenditures in long-term based investments.  
 Therefore, based on our discussion above, we hypothesize that following bank deregulation, 
the non-financial firms, on average, are likely to decrease their CSR activities.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample Selection 
 We start with the sample of firms included in the Compustat Annual database for the period 
of 1991 to 2005. Then we exclude firms that operate in financial industries (SIC between 6000 and 
6999), utility industries (SIC between 4900 – 4999), and firms for which information on 
headquarter location is not available in Compustat. We require the firms to have available 
information on the measures of corporate social responsibility, which we collect from the KLD 
database. We also require the firms to have enough information to calculate control variables. Our 
final sample consists of 14,037 observations with 4,792 unique firms.  
3.2. Measure of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 Our measure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores is based on a database 
originally developed by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD), which is 
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now run by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). KLD provides CSR ratings from 1991 
of approximately 650 US companies, consisting of S&P 500 and Domini 400 Social SM Index 
companies. Later, from 2001 to 2002, KLD increased its coverage by including the largest 1,000 
U.S. companies, and since 2003 the coverage expanded to the largest 3,000 U.S. companies.  
 Our paper focuses on five key categories of CSR activities in the KLD: Employee, 
Corporate Governance, Community, Environment, and Product Quality (Appendix A). Each 
category has a list strengths and concerns. A firm gains one point if it performs positively on a 
strength and loses one point if it takes negative action on a concern indicator.  Our main dependent 
variable is Net CSR Score, which is the difference between the sum of strengths and the sum of 
concerns across all five categories.  
3.3. Measure of Bank Deregulation 
 Intrastate and interstate banking restrictions have existed in the United States since the 
1900’s. Interstate banking was restricted by the McFadden Act of 1927, whereas intra-state 
expansion was restricted by state-level regulations. The Douglas Amendment to the 1956 Bank 
Holding Company was adopted to prevent the expansion across state borders by banks that 
circumvented regulations by forming multi-bank holding companies in states where expansion was 
not permitted. By 1992, many states had begun relaxing the restrictions by allowing out-of-state 
banks to buy in-state banks, but the restrictions were lifted by the Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA). However, the IBBEA contained provisions that granted states the 
right to block branch expansions. The following are the provisions that states could use to set 
restrictions on interstate branching: (1) the minimum age of the target institution, (2) de novo 
interstate branching, (3) a statewide deposit cap of less than 30%, and (4) the acquisition of 
individual branches.  
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 The first provision under the IBBEA allows states to set their own minimum age 
requirements with respect to how long a bank must have been in existence prior to its acquisition 
in an interstate bank merger with a requirement that the age can’t be more than 5 years. 
 The second provision that can be used to block or stall interstate expansion is to only permit 
de novo interstate branching if a state expressly “opts-in.”  
 The third provision states that an interstate merger transaction cannot involve the 
acquisition of a branch (or branches) of a bank without the acquisition of the entire bank, unless 
the state in which the branch is located “opts-in” such a purchase. 
 In the fourth provision, IBBEA specifies a statewide deposit concentration limitation that 
was initially set at 30% with respect to interstate mergers that constitute an initial entry of a bank 
within a state’s boundaries. States have the discretion to increase or decrease the cap. 
 Some states took advantage of these provisions by forbidding out-of-state banks from 
opening new branches or acquiring existing ones within their state boundaries. This takes us to the 
work of Rice and Strahan (2010). The authors created a deregulation index that rates the level of 
interstate branching restrictions based on the IBBEA. We will follow a similar index used by 
Krishnan (2014). The index values range from five to one. Five is used for a state that hasn’t placed 
any IBBEA restrictions to prevent expansion. Then one is subtracted for each implemented IBBEA 
restriction. Since there are four restrictions in a state’s arsenal to prevent out-of-state expansion, 
the least restricted state scores a five (no restrictions), while the most restricted state scores a one 
(four restrictions). In other words, five represents the most deregulated level of restrictions for a 
state and one represents the least deregulated level. The level of deregulation is increasing with the 
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value of the index. Zero is reserved for all the years prior to interstate bank branching deregulation. 
Bank branching laws and implementation dates are reported in Appendix A. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 1 shows that mean and median value of Deregulation index is 2.07 and 2, 
respectively. Note that a state is more deregulated with a higher value of deregulation index.  The 
mean of the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) which measures market concentration is .057 and 
the standard deviation is .050. Return on assets (ROA), a measure of how efficiently a company 
can manage it assets to produce profits during a period, has a mean of .032 and a standard deviation 
of .112. We observe that the average value of net CSR score is -0.306. Since net CSR score is the 
difference between total strengths and total concerns across five categories considered in this study, 
a negative net score indicates that CSR concerns are more powerful as a culture in a company that 
CSR strengths. Although median value of net CSR score as 0.00 suggests that out sample is less 
likely to be biased by an overwhelming number of firms with high positive CSR score or firms 
with negative CSR score.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics of key firm characteristics and CSR variables. Deregulation index 
is Rice and Strahan’s (2010) index of IBBEA deregulation, where the value of the variable ranges from 
1 to 5 with 1 indicating the least and 5 indicating the most deregulated state. HHI represents Hirschman-
Herfindahl index of sales, Leverage is total debt over total assets, ROA is return on assets as net income 
over total assets, Sales Growth is annual sales growth of firm-year, Size is natural logarithm of total assets. 
Net CSR score is difference between total strengths and total concerns across five categories (Community, 
Corporate Governance, Employee, Environment, and Product Quality). Net Community Score is the 
difference between strengths and concerns of the category of community. Other individual categories’ net 
scores are calculated the same way.  
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 1st Pctl 99th Pctl 
Deregulation index 14,037 2.703 2.000 1.593 1.000 5.000 
HHI 14,037 0.057 0.039 0.050 0.010 0.287 
leverage 14,037 0.230 0.207 0.197 0.000 0.895 
ROA 14,037 0.032 0.039 0.112 -0.511 0.254 
Sales Growth 14,037 0.146 0.091 0.304 -0.535 1.766 
Size 14,037 7.577 7.502 1.769 3.761 12.175 
Net CSR Score 14,037 -0.306 0.000 1.769 -6.000 4.000 
Net Community Score 14,037 0.149 0.000 0.623 -1.000 2.000 
Net Corp. Gov. Score 14,037 -0.157 0.000 0.658 -2.000 1.000 
Net Employee Score 14,037 -0.028 0.000 0.830 -2.000 2.000 
Net Environment Score 14,037 -0.122 0.000 0.725 -3.000 1.000 
Net Prod. Qual. Score 14,037 -0.147 0.000 0.636 -2.000 1.000 
 
Furthermore, among five categories of CSR activities, we find that only net community 
score shows an average value that is positive.  
4.2 Regression Analysis 
In our multivariate analysis, we first check how bank deregulation affects overall CSR 
activities of the firms. Using net CSR score as the dependent variable, in column 1 of Table 2, we 
find that the coefficient of Deregulation index is -0.073, which is significant at 1% level. The results 
suggest that an increase in deregulation significantly reduces a firm’s CSR initiatives. Note that the 
model used in column 1 does not include any control variables. Next, in column 2, we examine the 
relationship between bank deregulation and CSR after controlling for HHI, Leverage, ROA, Sales 
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growth, and Size. We find that the coefficient of Deregulation index is negative and statistically 
significant at 5% level.  
Finally, since practices of CSR could be influenced by local or state-wide business 
environment, and by industry affiliation, we control for both state and industry fixed effects in 
column 3. We find that the coefficient of Deregulation index is -0.195, which is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Nonetheless, compared to the results in columns 1 and 2, the result of 
column 3 seem highly economically significant, indicating a very strong negative relationship 
between financial market deregulation and CSR practices of nonfinancial firms.  
Column (3) of Table 2 shows that the coefficient of IBBEA_Deregulation is highly negative 
and statistically significant at 1% level. The results imply that CSR activities decrease when 
banking market becomes more deregulated or more competitive. This is in line with our hypothesis. 
We argue that increased bank competition might reduce CSR because more product market 
competitive pressure from more accessible credit make firms more concerned about shareholder 
value maximization. This is in line with the shareholder theory. Friedman (1962) argues that social 
responsibility wasn’t the duty of a corporation. He explains that in a free economy, “there is one 
and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.”  
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Table 2:  Deregulation’s Effect on CSR 
This table provides the regression results of the effect of interstate bank branching deregulation on CSR. 
The dependent variable is Net CSR score, which is the difference between total strengths and total 
concerns across five categories (Community, Corporate Governance, Employee, Environment, and 
Product Quality). Deregulation index is Rice and Strahan’s (2010) index of IBBEA deregulation, where 
the value of the variable ranges from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating least and 5 indicating most deregulated state. 
HHI represents Hirschman-Herfindahl index of sales, Leverage is total debt over total assets, ROA is 
return on assets as net income over total assets, Sales Growth is annual sales growth of firm-year, Size is 
natural logarithm of total assets.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Deregulation index -0.073*** -0.070** -0.195***  
(0.021) (0.025) (0.033) 
HHI 
 
-1.810*** -2.419***   
(0.163) (0.439) 
Leverage 
 
-0.331*** -0.055   
(0.072) (0.065) 
ROA 
 
1.153*** 1.218***   
(0.198) (0.195) 
Sales growth 
 
-0.002 0.077   
(0.063) (0.055) 
Size 
 
-0.198*** -0.246***   
(0.017) (0.019) 
State fixed effects No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 14,037 14,037 14,037 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.052 0.168 
 
In Table 3 we examine net score separately for each category. We find that except for 
Environment, the results of the other four categories confirm out main finding. With increased 
deregulation and in turn competition, we show negative relationships between 
IBBEA_Deregulaiton and the following CSR components: Employee (statistically significant at 
the 5% level), Corporate Governance (statistically significant at the 1% level), Community 
(statistically significant at the 1% level), and Product Quality (statistically significant at the 1% 
level) The Employee component of CSR.  
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Table 3: Deregulation and Net Strength of Each Component of CSR 
This table provides the regression results of interstate bank branching deregulation’s effect on CSR 
separately for each category (Employee, Corporate Governance, Community, Environment, and Product 
Quality). Deregulation index is Rice and Strahan’s (2010) index of IBBEA deregulation, where the value 
of the variable ranges from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating least and 5 indicating most deregulated state. HHI 
represents Hirschman-Herfindahl index of sales, Leverage is total debt over total assets, ROA is return 
on assets as net income over total assets, Sales Growth is annual sales growth of firm-year, Size is natural 
logarithm of total assets.  
Employee Corporate 
Governance 
Community Environment Product 
Quality 
Deregulation index -0.052** -0.030*** -0.069*** 0.003 -0.046***  
(0.020) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
HHI -1.360*** -0.186 -0.086 -0.301 -0.487***  
(0.422) (0.268) (0.108) (0.238) (0.129) 
Leverage -0.176*** 0.059 -0.123*** 0.081*** 0.104*** 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) 
ROA 0.750*** 0.126* 0.083 0.110 0.149*** 
 (0.089) (0.070) (0.055) (0.067) (0.035) 
Sales growth -0.021 -0.009 0.008 0.033* 0.065*** 
 (0.036) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
Size 0.076*** -0.186*** 0.087*** -0.101*** -0.121***  
(0.011) (0.017) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) 
Observations 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0810 0.236 0.159 0.189 0.203 
 
In Table 4 we examine strengths and concerns separately. The results in panel A and B 
suggest that it is the decrease of strengths and increase of concerns that result in the drop of net 
score following deregulation.  
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Table 4: Strength Versus Concern of Each CSR Component 
This table separately examines the effect of deregulation on CSR for strengths in Panel A and concerns 
in Panel B of 5 CSR categories: Employee, Corporate Governance, Community, Environment, and 
Product Quality. Strengths are positive CSR actions and concerns are negative CSR actions. Deregulation 
index is Rice and Strahan’s (2010) index of IBBEA deregulation, where the value of the variable ranges 
from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating least and 5 indicating most deregulated state. Control variables: HHI 
represents Hirschman-Herfindahl index of sales, Leverage is total debt over total assets, ROA is return on 
assets as net income over total assets, Sales Growth is annual sales growth of firm-year, Size is natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
  Panel A: Strength   
Total 
Score 
Employee Corporate 
Governance 
Community Environment Product 
Quality 
 
Deregulation index -0.091*** -0.007 0.014*** -0.054*** -0.020*** -0.024***   
(0.023) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037  
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.170 0.0809 0.238 0.182 0.124  
 Panel B: Concern  
 Total 
Score 
Employee Corporate 
Governance 
Community Environment Product 
Quality 
 
Deregulation index 0.104*** 0.045** 0.045*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.022***  
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037  
Adjusted R-squared 0.379 0.0739 0.234 0.148 0.367 0.282  
 
We argue that increased market competition, following a greater access to external 
financing through banking deregulation, would make the firms more concerned about shareholder 
value maximization and less concerned about stakeholder welfare. To examine it directly, in Table 
5, we use firm level price-cost margin following the measure of Peress (2010) to observe the 
deregulation effect on CSR. We predict that negative effect of deregulation should be more 
prevalent for the firms with low price cost margin or low market power that operate in high profit 
margin industry or in industry that could attract more entry of firms. Low_PCM is a dummy 
variable for the firms that fall below the median of quintile ranking of firm level price cost margin. 
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In column (3) of Table 5, we find that interaction term between IBBEA_Deregulation and 
Low_PCM is negative and significant. 
Table 5:  Market Structure 
This table uses firm level price-cost margin to observe the effect of deregulation on CSR. Low_PCM is a 
dummy variable for the firms that fall below the median quintile ranking of firm level price cost margin.  
IBBEA_Deregulation*Low PCM is an interaction term. Deregulation index is Rice and Strahan’s (2010) 
index of IBBEA deregulation, where the value of the variable ranges from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating least 
and 5 indicating most deregulated state. HHI represents Hirschman-Herfindahl index of sales, Leverage 
is total debt over total assets, ROA is return on assets as net income over total assets, Sales Growth is 
annual sales growth of firm-year, Size is natural logarithm of total assets. Net CSR score is difference 
between total strengths and total concerns across five categories (Community, Corporate Governance, 
Employee, Environment, and Product Quality).  
  Whole Sample Low Profit Margin 
Industry 
High Profit Margin 
Industry 
Deregulation index -0.186*** -0.167*** -0.192***  
(0.035) (0.039) (0.040) 
Low PCM -0.033 0.017 0.172  
(0.047) (0.087) (0.130) 
Deregulation index* Low PCM -0.025* -0.036 -0.076**  
(0.013) (0.026) (0.027) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,037 5,659 5,579 
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 0.150 0.207 
 
In Table 6 we create dummy variables for each level of deregulation and examine how the 
negative effect of deregulation on CSR varies across the different levels of restrictions. The biggest 
effect on CSR occurs when the deregulation index is equal to 4. The relation is a negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. On the other hand, there is a positive relation, 
though insignificant, only when IBBEA_Deregulation is at the least deregulated level. Again, the 
results are in line with our hypothesis.  
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Table 6: Level of Deregulation 
This table examines the effect of deregulation on CSR across the different levels of restrictions. Dummy 
variables are used for each level of deregulation expressed by IBBEA_Deregulation. Deregulation index 
is Rice and Strahan’s (2010) index of IBBEA deregulation, where the value of the variable ranges from 
1 to 5 with 1 indicating the least and 5 indicating the most deregulated state.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Most deregulated -0.577*** 
    
 
(0.125) 
    
Deregulation index_4   -0.850***    
  (0.085)    
Deregulation index_3    -0.491***   
   (0.162)   
Deregulation index_2     -0.401***  
    (0.112)  
Least deregulated     0.282 
     (0.179) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 14,037 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.157 0.154 0.154 0.152 
 
In Table 7 for further robustness tests, we use alternative measure of Net CSR Score. In column 
(1) we use raw net score reported, rather than actual net score calculated, and column (2) we use 
net score adjusted for available number of items in a particular year. The results still confirm our 
main findings.  
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Table 7:  Alternative Measure of CSR Net Score 
Raw Net Score: each dimension is associated with strengths (positive CSR actions) and concerns 
(negative CSR actions).  If the firm conducts a positive deed (negative deed) listed as a strength 
(concern) indicator, it gains (losses) one point. The raw KLD CSR score is the sum of five major 
dimension scores based on strength and concern indicators, with a higher value indicating better 
social performance. Adjusted Net Score: we construct another CSR measure by dividing the 
strength and concern scores for each dimension by the respective number of strength and concern 
indicators to derive adjusted strength and concern scores for that dimension and then taking the 
difference between the adjusted total strength score and the adjusted total concern score 
(“adjusted CSR score”). The adjusted CSR score thus gives equal weight to the five dimensions 
rather than to the individual indictors, mitigating any bias caused by an indicator on the social 
performance of firms in relatively irrelevant industries. 
  Raw Net Score 
(1) 
Adjusted Net Score 
(2) 
Deregulation index -0.194*** -0.045***  
(0.033) (0.007) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 14,037 14,037 
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 0.195 
 
5. Conclusion 
 We exploit a natural experiment following interstate banking deregulations to analyze the 
effect of banking competition on CSR. We follow Krishnan’s (2014) deregulation index for our 
competition measure and the database from Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics, 
Inc. for our CSR measures. With increased banking deregulation and in turn competition, we show 
a significant negative relationship between competition and CSR. The results of our analysis 
suggest that increased bank competition reduces CSR because more product market competitive 
pressure from more accessible credit makes firms more concerned about the views representing the 
shareholder theory over the stakeholder theory. 
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Appendix A 
 
KLD Strength and Concern Items 
KLD category Strength items Concern items 
 
Community Generous giving 
Innovative giving 
Support for housing 
Support for education 
Indigenous peoples relations 
Non-US charitable giving 
Other strength 
 
Investment controversies 
Negative economic impact 
Indigenous peoples relations 
Other concern 
Environment Beneficial products and services 
Pollution prevention 
Recycling 
Alternative fuels 
Communications 
Property, plant, and equipment 
Other strength 
 
Hazardous waste 
Regulatory problems 
Ozone depleting chemicals 
Substantial emissions 
Agricultural chemicals 
Climate change 
Other concern 
Employee Relations Strong union relations 
No layoff policy 
Cash profit sharing 
Employee involvement 
Strong retirement benefits 
Health and safety strength 
Other strength 
 
Poor union relations 
Health safety concern 
Workforce reductions 
Pension/benefits 
Other concern 
Product Quality Quality 
R&D/Innovation 
Product safety 
Marketing/contracting 
controversy 
 
Governance Political accountability 
Public policy 
Transparency 
Compensation 
Ownership 
Public policy 
Transparency 
Compensation 
Ownership 
Accounting 
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Appendix B 
  
Interstate Bank Branching (IBBEA) Laws by State 
State Effective 
Date 
Age 
restriction 
De novo interstate 
branching restriction 
(Yes = State restricts 
de novo interstate 
branching) 
Individual branch 
acquisition restriction 
(Yes = State does not 
allow acquisition of 
branches) 
Statewide 
cap on 
deposits 
restriction 
Reciprocity 
requirement 
Alabama 5/31/1997 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Alaska 1/1/1994 3 Yes  No 50% No 
Arizona 8/31/2001 5 Yes  No 30% Yes 
Arizona 9/1/1996 5 Yes  Yes 30% Yes 
Arkansas 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 25% No 
California 9/28/1995 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Colorado 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 25% No 
Connecticut 6/27/1995 5 No No 30% Yes 
Delaware 9/29/1995 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
DC 6/13/1996 No No No 30% No 
Florida 6/1/1997 3 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Georgia 5/10/2002 3 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Georgia 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Hawaii 1/1/2001 No No No 30% No 
Hawaii 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Idaho 9/29/1995 5 Yes  Yes No Yes 
Illinois 8/20/2004 No No No 30% Yes 
Illinois 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Indiana 7/1/1998 5 No No 30% Yes 
Indiana 6/1/1997 No No No 30% Yes 
Iowa 4/4/1996 5 Yes  Yes 15% No 
Kansas 9/29/1995 5 Yes  Yes 15% No 
Kentucky 3/22/2004 No Yes  Yes 15% Yes 
Kentucky 3/17/2000 No Yes  Yes 15% No 
Kentucky 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 15% No 
Louisiana 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Maine 1/1/1997 No No No 30% Yes 
Maryland 9/29/1995 No No No 30% No 
Massachusetts 8/2/1996 3 No No 30% Yes 
Michigan 11/29/1995 No No No No Yes 
Minnesota 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Mississippi 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 25% No 
Missouri 9/29/1995 5 Yes  Yes 13% No 
Montana 10/1/2001 5 Yes  Yes 22% No 
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Appendix B continued    
Montana 9/29/1995 
NA   
Increases 
1% 
per year 
from 18% 
to 22% No 
Nebraska 5/31/1997 5 Yes  Yes 14% No 
Nevada 9/29/1995 5 Limited Limited 30% No 
New Hampshire 1/1/2002 No No No 30% Yes 
New Hampshire 8/1/2000 5 No No 30% Yes 
New Hampshire 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 20% No 
New Jersey 4/17/1996 No Yes  No 30% No 
New Mexico 6/1/1996 5 Yes  Yes 40% No 
New York 6/1/1997 5 Yes  No 30% No 
North Carolina 7/1/1995 No No No 30% Yes 
North Dakota 8/1/2003 No No No 25% Yes 
North Dakota 5/31/1997 No Yes  Yes 25% Yes 
Ohio 5/21/1997 No No No 30% No 
Oklahoma 5/17/2000 No No No 20% Yes 
Oklahoma 5/31/1997 5 Yes  Yes 15% No 
Oregon 7/1/1997 3 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Pennsylvania 7/6/1995 No No No 30% Yes 
Rhode Island 6/20/1995 No No No 30% Yes 
South Carolina 7/1/1996 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
South Dakota 3/9/1996 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Tennessee 3/17/2003 3 No No 30% Yes 
Tennessee 7/1/2001 5 No No 30% Yes 
Tennessee 5/1/1998 5 Yes  No 30% Yes 
Tennessee 6/1/1997 5 Yes  Yes 30% Yes 
Texas 9/1/1999 No No No 20% Yes 
Texas 8/28/1995 N/A N/A N/A 20% N/A 
Utah 4/30/2001 5 No No 30% Yes 
Utah 6/1/1995 5 Yes  No 30% No 
Vermont 1/1/2001 No No No 30% Yes 
Vermont 5/30/1996 5 Yes  No 30% No 
Virginia 9/29/1995 No No No 30% Yes 
Washington 5/9/2005 5 No No 30% Yes 
Washington 6/6/1996 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
West Virginia 5/31/1997 No No No 25% Yes 
Wisconsin 5/1/1996 5 Yes  Yes 30% No 
Wyoming 5/31/1997 3 Yes  Yes 30% No 
This table reports the changes in interstate bank branching laws in the United States from 1994 to 2005. This data is from Johnson and Rice (2008). 
The effective date of the state’s implementation of interstate bank branching restrictions allowed under the Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (IBBEA) is in the first column, with some states having multiple effective dates as they imposed or removed restrictions gradually. 
The next five columns then report the actual restrictions set by each state as of each effective date. 
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Chapter 2. An Empirical Analysis of the Interaction Between Price Stability and Financial 
Stability: The Case of the Fragile Five 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Fragile Five 
 Economists have been known to use acronyms and coined phrases to identify particular 
groups of countries that share characteristics based on populations, demographics, geography, and 
economic outlook.  Former Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the acronym BRIC in 
2001 to represent the group of emerging markets countries that includes Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China. These countries were considered great opportunities for foreign expansion and promising 
investments. O’Neill later used MINT in 2011 to reference another special group of emerging 
countries that include Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey. He felt that the countries had very 
favorable demographics and interesting economic prospects. In 2013, James Lord, a research 
analyst at Morgan Stanley, used the phrase “Fragile Five” to represent emerging market economies 
that possessed fragile financial systems and were extremely reliant on foreign investments to cover 
their current account deficits and finance growth. These factors made them vulnerable to external 
shocks. Four out of the five countries were previously on the bright-outlook groups of BRIC or 
MINT. The Fragile Five group initially consisted of the following countries: Turkey, Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, and South Africa. Columbia and Mexico were considered replacements in the Fragile 
Five group after the economies of India and Indonesia experienced improvements. Bloomberg 
(2015) suggested that Russia, Columbia, and Peru should be added to the original list after their 
economies began to falter. In addition to financial fragilities, Fragile Five countries share volatility 
in their national currencies, high external debt, and a critically high current account deficit.  
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1.2. Beginning of Fragility 
 An emerging market economy is a nation's economy that is progressing toward becoming 
advanced, as shown by some liquidity in local debt and equity markets and the existence of some 
form of market exchange and regulatory body. Emerging market economies exhibit varying levels 
of economic growth, inflation, trade and fiscal conditions. BRIC countries were considered the 
most promising of the emerging markets countries in 2001. MINT was coined in 2011 to represent 
another group of emerging market economies poised for economic prosperity.  In the early stages 
of the post-crisis recovery, emerging market economies benefited from a supportive external 
financing environment. Global funding conditions were favorable to emerging market economies, 
with central banks in advanced economies pursuing accommodative policies, keeping interest rates 
low and engaging in large-scale asset purchases. Capital flows continued to flow in the direction 
of emerging market economies. However, the promise of riches changed in the summer of 2013 
for some of the emerging markets countries when Ben Bernanke commented that the Federal 
Reserve would lower the number of assets purchased each month if economic conditions, such as 
inflation and unemployment, were favorable. This was the start of tapering or gradual winding 
down of central bank activities used to improve the conditions for economic growth. External 
funding conditions tightened in anticipation of an increase in US interest rates. “Taper tantrum” 
resulted when investors panicked in reaction to the tapering news and withdrew their money from 
the bond market. During this period, China began to change its exchange rate policy which fuelled 
more uncertainty and financial market volatility. Therefore, a sudden shift in global risk sentiment 
could pose risks to the economic outlook of emerging markets economies. In May of 2013, 
speculation about the speed of monetary policy tightening in the United States caused a marked 
increase in the yield on ten-year US Treasury bonds, which rose by almost 100 basis points between 
then and the end of the year. Asset prices of emerging market countries fell and some countries’ 
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currencies depreciated quickly. Economies with external fragilities, such as large current account 
deficits or heavy reliance on external funding, experienced particularly severe financial turmoil. 
 James Lord, a research analyst for Morgan Stanley, used the phrase Fragile Five to identify 
the emerging market economies that had become too dependent on unreliable foreign investment 
to finance their growth pursuits. The group includes Turkey, Brazil, India, South Africa, and 
Indonesia. The recovery that followed in developed markets drew a lot of capital flows back home 
and resulted in less foreign direct investment in emerging markets. Many of the emerging market 
countries’ currencies experienced significant weakness and made it difficult to finance current 
account deficits. The lack of new investments also made it impossible to finance many growth 
projects, which contributed to a slowdown in their respective economies.  
 
1.3. Financial Stability 
 Financial stability is concerned with the stability of financial institutions as well as the 
stability of the financial markets in which they operate. Svensson (2014) defined financial stability 
as “a situation where the financial system can fulfil its three main functions -- transforming saving 
into financing, providing risk management, and transmitting payments -- with sufficient resilience 
to disruptions that threaten these functions.” The Reserve Bank adds that for financial institutions 
to be considered stable, they must have “sufficient liquidity to manage operations and volatility in 
normal periods.” The Reserve Bank suggests that market are stable when positive economic 
consequences can be experienced throughout certain levels of volatility. A primary goal 
considering the recent global economic crisis, is to avoid these crises in the future. The ability to 
manage systemic financial risk goes far as one of the necessary objectives in avoiding crises. 
Private risk management is the channel through which this can be accomplished by market 
participants. The responsible authority, the central bank or a financial supervisory authority 
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depending on the country, can manage the risk through market surveillance and banking 
supervision. 
 The instruments that can be used varies depending on whether the economy is under normal 
circumstances or crises circumstances. According to Svensson (2014), the instruments during 
normal times include supervision, regulation and communication, including capital and liquidity 
requirements, loan-to-value (LTV) caps, and financial stability reports. In crisis times, lender of 
last resort, variable rate lending at longer maturities (credit easing), guarantees, bank resolution, 
capital injections, asset purchases, etc. 
 
1.4. Inflation Targeting 
 Tight monetary policies were adopted by central banks in order to overcome the economic 
downturn during the 1970s. Inflation targeting was adopted by many central banks as a practical 
answer to the failing monetary policies, such as money growth targeting, exchange rate targeting, 
or currency pegging. In December 1989, New Zealand became the first country to adopt inflation 
targeting as a monetary policy strategy. In the 1990s, inflation targeting was mainly adopted by 
advanced countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden and others. More recently 
several emerging and developing economies, including Fragile Five countries, followed suit: Brazil 
and Columbia in 1999, South Africa in 2000, Mexico in 2001, Peru in 2002, Indonesia in 2005, 
and Turkey in 2006.  Inflation targeting became a key part in laying the groundwork for the Great 
Moderation, the period from the mid-1980s to 2007, which was characterized by low and relatively 
stable inflation.  
 However, the emergence of the global financial crisis in 2008 was reason enough for policy 
makers to determine that monetary policy strategies needed to be revised. The central banks must 
now pay closer attention to financial stability in their monetary policy responsibilities. During this 
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period, central banks were given mandates to preserve price stability and the autonomy to 
accomplish the pursuit.  
 
2. Theoretical Background  
2.1. Monetary and Financial Policies 
 Svensson (2012) explains that the core objective of monetary policy is price stability. 
Inflation should be stabilized around an inflation target and the employment of resources should be 
around a tenable level. The following are additional required tasks of inflation targeting: the 
medium-term target for inflation should be announced, policy objectives should be stated, 
transparency should be applied in the actions of the central bank. The appropriate instruments 
during non-crisis periods are the policy rate and communication which includes published accounts 
of inflation forecasts, the real economy, and the policy rate. In more dire cases like the recent 
financial crisis, unconventional methods may be adapted: modification of the size and makeup of 
central bank assets, fixed rate lending at longer maturities, and foreign exchange intervention. The 
goal of financial policy is to maintain and promote financial stability. The instruments during 
normal periods are supervision, capital and liquidity requirements, and financial stability reports. 
The instruments under crisis times are lending of last resort, variable rate lending at longer 
maturities, special resolution regimes for insolvent financial firms, government lending guarantees, 
and government capital injections.  
 
2.2. Price and Financial Stability Relation 
 A correlation between financial and price stability that is constituted in the monetary view 
holds that the unexpected inflation resulting from increases or decreases in the money supply may 
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lead to banking panics. The financial fragility view holds that in periods of economic booms, 
confidence and leverage increase which in turn leads to an increase in over-indebtedness.  
 According to Borio et al. (2000), a monetary regime that produces aggregate price stability 
will, as a by-product, tend to promote stability of the financial system. This is called the 
conventional wisdom or the Schwarz hypothesis. It is common knowledge that inflation rate 
volatility could cause chaos in the financial system. Defaults are more likely when the real value 
of outstanding debt increases because of unexpected declines in inflation. This situation is further 
exacerbated during monetary contractions and other restrictive fiscal policies. Financial stability is 
also threatened in a high inflation environment when the setting is ideal for increased asset 
acquisitions and misallocation of resources.  According to Schwartz 1995, central banks are 
primarily assigned the price stability objectives and only implicitly the financial stability objective. 
Bordo et al. (2001) concluded that there was a positive relationship between price and financial 
stability. The authors also concluded that unexpected increases in inflation and price levels have 
led to financial instability. The evidence in Woodford (2011) supports the conventional wisdom. 
He found that impacts by monetary policy on price and financial stability were in the same 
direction. The recent financial crisis has of course lessened the confidence in the conventional 
wisdom view. Blot et al. (2015) examined A.J. Schwarz’s “conventional wisdom” that price 
stability would yield financial stability. The authors reject the hypothesis that price stability is 
positively correlated with financial stability and that the correlation is stable over time. Svensson 
(2012) advises that monetary policy should be conducted taking financial policy into account, and 
financial policy should be conducted taking monetary policy into account. When disruptions 
subject financial markets to unusually strong selling pressures, NYSE specialists and NASDAQ 
market makers typically lean against the wind by absorbing the markets’ selling pressure and 
creating liquidity: they buy large quantities of assets and build up inventories when selling pressure 
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in the market is large; then dispose of those inventories after that selling pressure has subsided. The 
Federal Reserve as the nation’s monetary authority pursues an activist, countercyclical monetary 
policy. When the Fed perceives economic activity to be waning, it attempts to boost output and 
employment by increasing the supply of money, thereby putting downward pressure on interest 
rates and stimulating growth in such interest-sensitive sectors as housing and consumer durables. 
 When the Fed perceives inflation to be accelerating it does the opposite – it restricts the 
growth of money, which tends to put upward pressure on interest rates and ease inflationary 
pressures. 
 Before the global financial crisis, numerous central bankers felt that financial stability 
considerations should not have a part in monetary policy decisions. Woodford (2011) explained 
several reasons why the two policies should remain distinct. One reason is that crises situations are 
too unpredictable to prevent. Another reason for keeping financial stability attention away from 
monetary policymaking is because of the uncertainty of the effectiveness of monetary policy on 
financial stability risks. In the short-term, interest rate adjustments made by the central bank have 
only a small effect on the stock-market unless the changes in monetary policy were severe. The 
third reason is that monetary policy may not be the best tool available for financial stability. Better 
tools would include supervisory policy, regulatory policy, or macro-prudential policy.  
 The financial crisis brought on the new difficult challenge of finding an appropriate level 
of consideration of monetary policy on the objectives of financial stability. IMF (2013) explained 
a view that combines monetary policy and macroprudential policies to focus on countercyclical 
management: monetary policy would target price stability, macroprudential policy would focus on 
financial stability, and microprudential policy would focus on the safety and soundness of 
individual financial institutions.  
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 The uncertainty brought on by the arguments and debates of these authors has inspired us 
to find out the relationship between price stability and financial stability. Do the instruments used 
to stabilize the objective of one policy affect the objectives of the other policy? If so, how are the 
objectives affected? 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data and Variables 
 The relation between financial stability and price stability is measured in two steps for the 
fragile five countries. In the first step, we investigate the causation linkage between price and 
financial stability indicators. In the second step, we try to measure the effects of monetary policy 
tools employed by the central bank of each country. The policy tools are lending rate and required 
reserve ratio for financial stability and policy rate for price stability. 
 Stability of the financial system has been defined by numerous institutions and prepared 
indexes covering different parts of the financial sector. According to IMF (2003), ingredients of 
the index might be different for advanced and emerging market economies. Although the index for 
advanced economies includes institutions other than banks, the banking system is the most crucial 
part of the whole system. The classification and indexation methods are based on this explanation. 
So, we employ four sub-indicators to build up the financial stability index (FSI). These are asset 
quality rate, liquidity rate, capital adequacy rate, earnings and profitability rates. Each sub-indicator 
is measured by two ratios listed in Table 1. The financial stability index is constituted by the 
average of four sub-indicators. The weight of each sub-indicator is the same. An increase in the 
liquidity rate, profitability rate, and capital adequacy rate affects financial stability positively. This 
means an increase in one of them induces an increase in FSI. On the other hand, asset quality rate 
measures mainly the size of non-performing loans (NPL) in the system. The higher the value for 
36 
 
asset quality rate, the higher is the credit risk. That is why if the asset quality ratio increases, that 
means the size of NPL increases and the stability of financial system declines. In the end, an 
increase (decrease) in the financial stability index means that the stability of the financial system 
improves (worsens). 
 
 
Table 1: List of Financial Stability Indicators 
Indicator Abbreviation Definition / Ratio Coefficient 
Asset Quality Rate aqrate 
Non-performing Loans Net of Provisions to 
Capital 0.50 
Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 0.50 
Liquidity Rate lrate Liquid Assets to Total Assets (Liquid Asset 
Ratio) 
0.50 
Liquid Assets to Short Term Liabilities 0.50 
Profitability Rate prate Return on Equity 0.50 
Return on Assets 0.50 
Capital Adequacy Rate csrate 
Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 0.50 
Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
0.50 
Financial Stability Index FSI Average of four sub-indicators 
 
 In order to measure price stability, we employ inflation gap instead of actual inflation rate. 
The reason is that central banks target a certain inflation rate annually or for a period which means 
the banks do not aim to reach a zero-point inflation rate. In this regard, the difference between 
actual inflation and the inflation target meets the price stability objective, even though the gap 
might be negative. The inflation target of Brazil, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico and Peru are 
4.5%, 6%, 3%, 3% and 2%, respectively. On the other hand, The Central Bank of Republic of 
Turkey announces the target annually and it has been modified according to economic conditions. 
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In this regard, it varies between 4-8%. Similarly, the inflation target varies in Indonesia between 4-
5%.  
 In the first step, we employ both time series and panel data methods to find the possible 
linkage between price and financial stability indexes. The bootstrap based Toda-Yamamoto 
causality method developed by Hatemi-J (2007) and the asymmetric causality method developed 
by Hatemi-J and Roca (2014) are employed. Also, we employ Emirmahmutoglu (2011) panel 
causality method to test causality between indexes. 
 In the second step, we investigate the effectiveness of each policy tool employed to achieve 
price and financial stability objectives and employ both time series and panel data methods. To 
determine the possible effects of each instrument, we investigate the following equation that 
includes inflation gap and the financial stability index using their lags. We use i to connote policy 
rate, rrr to connote reserve requirements ratio, lend to connote lending rate, and infgap to connote 
gap between actual inflation rate and target: 
 
0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
inf inf
k d k d k d
t i t i j t j i t i j t j i t i j t j t
i j k i j k i j k
Policy tool a a i a i gap gap FSI FSI         
        
              . 
 
 We use two main data sources which are both published by International Monetary Fund. 
The financial stability index data is collected from Financial Soundness Indicators, whereas the 
data of each policy instrument and inflation rate are collected from International Finance Statistics. 
The inflation target for each country is collected from the website of each central bank. Table 2 
presents the time span for each country. 
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Table 2: Time Span 
Brazil 2005Q1-2016Q1 
Turkey 2007Q2-2015Q4 
Indonesia 2011Q4-2016Q1 
South Africa 2008Q1-2016Q1 
Mexico 2005Q1-2015Q4 
Peru 2010Q4-2016Q1 
Colombia 2005Q1-2016Q1 
 
3.2. Interaction Between Policy Objectives, Time Series Analysis 
 In the first step, it is helpful to present descriptive statistics to understand the nature of the 
series pertaining to each country’s variables. Data for variables are obtained from International 
Financial Statistics. The descriptive statistics of variables are reported in Table 3. Data 
characteristics are slightly different in each country. According to the results, the standard deviation 
of financial stability in Brazil are high compared to others. On the other hand, inflation gap deviates 
in South Africa and Turkey. When we look at the skewness coefficients, the inflation gap series 
skewed to left for all countries except Turkey. Financial stability index series are skewed to left for 
all countries except Turkey, South Africa, and Indonesia. Kurtosis coefficients show that the 
financial stability series for Brazil and Mexico are steep. The other series are considerably flat. The 
Jarque and Bera normal distribution test results confirm the alternative hypothesis claiming 
abnormal distribution for financial stability index in Brazil and Mexico and inflation gap in South 
Africa. The rest of variables have normal distribution. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Country Date Variables Mean Std.Dev. Coef. of Var. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Brazil 2005Q1-2016Q1 
Fsi 51.821 22.361 0.431 4.384 25.898 1127.2 (0.00)*** 
infgap 1.404 1.652 1.176 0.741 3.770 5.239 (0.07)* 
Colombia 2005Q1-2016Q1 
Fsi 47.425 7.207 0.151 0.682 2.892 3.513 (0.172) 
infgap 1.159 1.658 1.430 0.505 2.381 2.636 (0.267) 
Indonesia 2011Q4-2016Q1 
Fsi 47.081 4.946 0.105 -0.425 2.157 1.074 (0.584) 
infgap 1.297 1.600 1.233 0.193 1.380 2.07 (0.353) 
Mexico 2005Q1-2015Q4 
Fsi 50.256 11.322 0.225 2.357 10.766 151.35 (0.00)*** 
infgap 1.022 0.841 0.822 0.790 3.902 6.072 (0.04)** 
South Africa 2008Q1-2016Q1 
Fsi 64.468 9.151 0.141 -0.267 2.237 1.193 (0.55) 
infgap 0.258 2.312 8.961 1.556 5.033 19.002 (0.00)*** 
Turkey 2007Q2-2015Q4 
Fsi 41.687 8.755 0.210 -0.087 2.362 0.638 (0.726) 
infgap 2.786 2.347 0.842 -0.265 2.955 0.414 (0.813) 
Peru 2010Q4-2016Q1 Fsi 45.941 2.802 0.060 0.417 1.985 1.584 (0.452) 
infgap 1.321 0.663 0.501 0.209 2.254 0.670 (0.715) 
Notes: Coefficient of variation is the ratio of standard deviation to mean. The figures ***, **, * show 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels, respectively.  
  
We need to determine whether unit roots are present in the time series prior to the VAR and VAR 
based causality testing. To do so, we use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979 and 1981) and 
Phillips-Perron (1988) tests. Results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Unit Root Test Results 
Levels Country Vrb. ADF PP 
First-
Differences 
Country Vrb. ADF PP 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
Brazil 
fsi 
-4.568 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-4.651 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
Brazil 
fsi 
-11.142 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-41.401 (42) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-1.790 (1) 
[0.380] 
-0.984 (3) 
[0.750] 
infgap 
-4.025 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-4.072 (2) 
[0.00]*** 
Colombia 
fsi 
-1.472 (3) 
[0.537] 
-3.007 (10) 
[0.041]** 
Colombia 
fsi 
-9.285 (2) 
[0.00]*** 
-20.063 (12) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-1.870 (1) 
[0.342] 
-1.503 (3) 
[0.522] 
infgap 
-3.241 (0) 
[0.024]** 
-3.317 (3) 
[0.020]** 
Indonesia 
fsi 
0.600 (2) 
[0.984] 
-0.598 (9) 
[0.846] 
Indonesia 
fsi 
-4.333 (1) 
[0.00]*** 
-5.093 (15) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-2.045 (0) 
[0.266] 
-2.045 (0) 
[0.266] 
infgap 
-4.092 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-3.650 (1) 
[0.016]** 
Mexico 
fsi 
-2.799 (0) 
[0.066]* 
-2.679 (3) 
[0.085]* 
Mexico 
fsi 
-9.338 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-11.856 (9) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-2.563 (7) 
[0.109] 
-2.017 (4) 
[0.278] 
infgap 
-4.051 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-7.211 (4) 
[0.00]*** 
South 
Africa 
fsi 
-2.115 (0) 
[0.240] 
-2.310 (4) 
[0.175] South 
Africa 
fsi 
-4.501 (0) 
[0.04]** 
-4.431 (1) 
[0.41]** 
infgap 
-4.215 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-1.918 (2) 
[0.319] 
infgap 
-4.123 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-4.140 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
Turkey 
fsi 
-1.061 (0) 
[0.719] 
-1.035 (3) 
[0.729] 
Turkey 
fsi 
-5.875 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-5.880 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-2.127 (4) 
[0.235] 
-2.207 (6) 
[0.207] 
infgap 
-6.015 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-4.558 (9) 
[0.00]*** 
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Table 4 continued 
 Peru 
fsi 
-1.995 (0) 
[0.286] 
-1.887 (2) 
[0.331]  
Peru fsi 
-4.093 (1) 
[0.00]*** 
-6.340 (5) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-0.670 (4) 
[0.828] 
-2.079 (2) 
[0.253] 
 infgap 
-5.909 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-3.476 (2) 
[0.020]** 
T
re
n
d
 a
n
d
 I
n
te
rc
ep
t 
Brazil 
fsi 
-6.587 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-6.587 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
T
re
n
d
 a
n
d
 I
n
te
rc
ep
t 
Brazil 
fsi 
-11.005 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-40.900 (42) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-3.655 (1) 
(0.036)** 
-2.096 (2) 
[0.533] 
infgap 
-4.507 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-4.588 (1) 
[0.00]*** 
 
Colombia 
fsi 
-2.629 (3) 
[0.270] 
-6.039 (10) 
[0.00]*** 
Colombia 
fsi 
-9.224 (2) 
[0.00]*** 
-20.904 (12) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-1.470 (1) 
[0.824] 
-0.951 (3) 
[0.940] 
infgap 
-3.415 (0) 
[0.062]* 
-3.485 (3) 
[0.053]* 
Indonesia 
fsi 
-2.778 (3) 
[0.226] 
-3.005 (16) 
[0.159] 
Indonesia 
fsi 
-5.730 (1) 
[0.00]*** 
-7.148 (10) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-1.643 (0) 
[0.731] 
-1.643 (0) 
[0.731] 
infgap 
-6.225 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-3.779 (2) 
[0.046]** 
Mexico 
fsi 
-4.134 (0) 
[0.011]** 
-4.184 (3) 
[0.010]** 
Mexico 
fsi 
-9.215 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-11.681 (9) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-3.572 (7) 
[0.046]** 
-2.249 (4) 
[0.451] 
infgap 
-4.161 (3) 
[0.011]** 
-7.174 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
South 
Africa 
fsi 
-4.179 (0) 
[0.015]** 
-3.643 (2) 
[0.041]** South 
Africa 
fsi 
-2.403 (0) 
[0.370] 
-2.403 (0) 
[0.370] 
infgap 
-3.698 (3) 
[0.038]** 
-1.584 (2) 
[0.776] 
infgap 
-4.429 (0) 
[0.00]*** 
-4.380 (2) 
[0.00]*** 
Turkey 
fsi 
-2.447 (0) 
[0.350] 
-2.556 (3) 
[0.301] 
Turkey 
fsi 
-5.157 (6) 
[0.00]*** 
-5.792 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-2.212 (4) 
[0.465] 
-2.075 (6) 
[0.540] 
infgap 
-6.287 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-4.426 (9) 
[0.00]*** 
Peru 
fsi 
-3.070 (0) 
[0.138] 
-3.060 (1) 
[0.140] 
 
Peru 
fsi 
-3.997 (1) 
[0.027]** 
-6.482 (5) 
[0.00]*** 
infgap 
-0.343 (4) 
[0.980] 
-2.078 (2) 
[0.527] 
 infgap 
-6.608 (3) 
[0.00]*** 
-3.367 (2) 
[0.084]* 
Notes: The figures ***, **, * show 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
For the ADF test: The figures in parenthesis denote the results of Dickey Fuller test in the case of zero lag length and 
lag length chosen due to SIC criteria. For the ADF test, the Mac Kinnon (1996) critical values for constant -3.485, -
2.885, -2.579 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The critical values for constant and trend are -4.035, -3.447 and -3.148 at 
the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, respectively. 
For the PP test: Values in the parenthesis show bandwidths obtained according to Newey-West using Bartlett Kernel 
criteria.  For the PP test Mac Kinnon (1996) critical values for constant -3.483, -2.884, -2.579 at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. The critical values for constant and trend -4.033, -3.446 and -3.148 at the 1% 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 According to ADF and PP unit root tests results, it is certain that financial stability and 
inflation gap are stationary in their first difference for all countries. Accordingly, the maximum 
integration order (d) of the variables equals one in the Toda Yamamoto (TY hereafter) procedure 
and the series in the first difference will be used in the other causality test. We use Schwartz 
Information Criteria (SIC) to select lag lengths for Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa (2), 
Colombia and Turkey (3), Mexico and Peru (4) as the order of VAR. 
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Table 5. Linear TY Granger Causality Test 
FSI does not Granger cause of infgap Infgap does not Granger cause of fsi 
Countries Statistics 1% 5% 10% Statistics 1% 5% 10% 
Brazil 0.477 (0.787) 20.573 13.675 11.286 3.601 (0.165) 18.999 12.609 10.188 
Colombia 2.478 (0.479) 19.111 13.023 10.659 3.072 (0.380) 20.204 13.433 10.630 
Indonesia 1.372 (0.848) 311.252 65.810 31.743 76.208 (0.00)*** 418.577 68.994** 33.874* 
Mexico 1.186 (0.756) 10.501 6.587 4.945 3.606 (0.307) 10.605 6.612 5.013 
South Africa 16.224 (0.00)*** 19.001 12.121** 9.315* 3.241 (0.518) 18.814 11.920 9.262 
Turkey 4.124 (0.389) 18.564 11.948 9.272 2.303 (0.680) 17.133 11.191 8.745 
Peru 2.164 (0.338) 14.148 7.809 5.674 3.146 (0.270) 15.023 8.467 6.043 
Notes: The figures ***, **, * show 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Brackets denote results of asymptotic TY. 
The SIC was used to determine the optimal lag lengths for VAR (p+d) models. Bootstrap critical values are obtained 
from 10,000 replications. 
 
 According to results obtained from TY Granger causality test shown in Table 5, there is no 
causation linkage between variables in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey and Peru. The results for 
five of seven claim that there is no guarantee about the stable financial system, even if the price 
stability is achieved. That is the opposite of the classical view. On the other hand, uni-directional 
causality running from financial stability to price stability exists in South Africa. That means a 
change in the financial environment of South Africa would influence the inflation rate. Moreover, 
empirical findings indicate that the inflation gap is effective on financial stability in Indonesia. This 
is consistent with the implications of Schwartz (1995).  
 Another causality test technique we employ is the Breitung and Candelon’s (2006) causality 
analysis which offers a way to decompose the causality test statistic into different frequencies. We 
calculate the test statistics at a high frequency of  ωi = 2.5 and ωi = 2.00  to examine short term 
causality, ωi = 1.00 and ωi = 1.50 to examine medium term causality and finally ωi = .1  and ωi = 
.5  to investigate long term causality. Results obtained from frequency domain causality test are 
presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Results for Frequency Domain Causality 
 fsi does not Granger cause of infgap Infgap does not Granger cause of fsi 
Countries 
Long Term Med Term Short Term Long Term Med Term Short Term 
0.01 0.05 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 0.01 0.05 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 
Brazil 2.468 2.486 0.564 0.161 2.183 3.090 0.633 0.631 2.115 0.012 0.001 1.781 
Colombia 0.190 0.191 2.550 1.045 0.889 2.931 0.972 0.949 1.800 2.927 0.307 2.125 
Mexico 1.456 1.459 0.247 0.611 0.948 0.619 0.127 0.129 1.050 1.242 2.711 1.033 
Notes: The lag lengths for the VAR models are determined by SIC. F-distribution with (2, T-2p) degrees of freedom 
equals about 3,23 for Brazil; 3,24 for Colombia; and 3,23 for Mexico. For every ωi (frequency) between 0 and π, ω ϵ 
(0, π). 
  
 The frequency domain causality analysis results contain only three of ‘fragile five’ countries 
because of the sufficient data absence. Results for Brazil, Colombia and Mexico denote that there 
is no interaction between variables. That is consistent with the view that claims price stability does 
not guarantee financial stability. 
 In Table 7, the results are obtained from the asymmetric causality test method developed 
by Hatemi-J and Roca (2014). Similarly, results are obtained for only three of the countries 
analyzed. These are Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. According to the results, a decline in inflation 
gap induces an increase in the stability of the Brazilian financial system. The bootstrap analysis 
also supports the results. Similarly, a reduction in the inflation gap would lead to an increase in the 
financial stability. These results are consistent with the classical view claiming that price stability 
is a pre-condition of financial stability. On the other hand, in Colombia an increase (decrease) in 
financial stability causes a decrease (increase) in inflation gap. That means causality occurs in both 
cases. Contrary to classical view, results indicates that financial stability is the pre-condition of 
success in inflation targeting. 
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3.3. Interaction Between Policy Objectives, Panel Data Analysis 
 To investigate the unit root of the variables, the first task is to determine if there is a cross 
section dependency among the countries. If there is no cross-section dependency, first generation 
unit root test methods are applied. On the other hand, if there is a cross section dependency, second 
generation unit root test methods are applied. To investigate the cross-section dependency in panel 
data methods we employ Peseran (2004) CDLM, Breusch-Pagan (1979) CDLM1 and Peseran (2004) 
CDLM2 test methods. CDLM1 and CDLM2 test methods are employed if T>N. On the other hand, we 
employ CDLM test in the case of N>T. While T denotes size of time period, N denotes the number 
of countries. 
In cross dependency tests; 
H0: there is no cross-section dependency. 
H1: there is cross section dependency. 
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Table 7. Hatemi J (2012)-Roca (2014) Asymmetric Causality Test Results 
 Causality MWALD 
1% Bootstrap 
Critical Value 
5% Bootstrap 
Critical Value 
10% Bootstrap 
Critical Value 
Causality MWALD 
1% Bootstrap 
Critical Value 
5% Bootstrap 
Critical Value 
10% Bootstrap 
Critical Value 
B
ra
zi
l 
(fsi)+≠> (infgap)+ 0.009 (0.923) 10.923 5.725 3.640 (infgap)+≠>(fsi)+ 0.002 (0.960) 9.451 4.562 3.020 
(fsi)+≠> (infgap)- 0.001 (0.973) 9.712 4.897 3.027 (infgap)+≠>(fsi)- 3.581 (0.611) 772.862 125.191 47.030 
(fsi)-≠> (infgap)- 1.063 (0.900) 57.247 20.230 14.006 (infgap)-≠>(fsi)- 17.910 (0.00)*** 47.921 21.624 15.391* 
(fsi)-≠> (infgap)+ 1.110 (0.292) 13.953 5.778 3.413 (infgap)-≠>(fsi)+ 1637.0 (0.00)*** 370.964*** 79.887** 40.679* 
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
 (fsi)+≠> (infgap)+ 4.728 (0.03) 8.674 4.740 3.042 (infgap)+≠>(fsi)+ 0.908 (0.341) 11.294 5.737 3.581 
(fsi)+≠> (infgap)- 18.102 (0.00)*** 496.53 97.451 48.184 (infgap)+≠>(fsi)- 0.037 (0.982) 14.850 8.759 5.935 
(fsi)-≠> (infgap)- 0.792 (0.673) 15.287 8.843 6.254 (infgap)-≠>(fsi)- 0.895 (0.639) 14.745 9.628 6.718 
(fsi)-≠> (infgap)+ 12.881 (0.02)** 432.24 93.663 48.828 (infgap)-≠>(fsi)+ 0.508 (0.776) 16.383 9.630 7.00 
M
ex
ic
o
 
(fsi)+≠> (infgap)+ 0.337 (0.562) 9.535 4.867 3.380 (infgap)+≠>(fsi)+ 0.161 (0.688) 10.373 4.913 3.443 
(fsi)+≠> (infgap)- 1.579 (0.209) 9.946 4.985 3.351 (infgap)+≠>(fsi)- 0.462 (0.993) 381.42 75.053 38.629 
(fsi)-≠> (infgap)- 2.794 (0.732) 325.98 71.433 30.513 (infgap)-≠>(fsi)- 12.494 (0.02)** 573.54 110.58 55.901 
(fsi)-≠> (infgap)+ 0.014 (0.906) 8.086 4.562 3.129 (infgap)-≠>(fsi)+ 936.63 (0.00)*** 597.15*** 102.74** 46.383* 
Not: ≠> sign shows that there is no causality. The values in the parenthesis show the probability ratios asymptotically. *. ** and *** supports causality in 90%. 95% and 99% 
confidences interval. The Bootstrap number is 10.000. 
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Table 8. Cross Section Dependency Test Results in Level 
 Model with Constant Model with Constant and Trend 
 FSI infgap FSI Infgap 
 Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
lmCD  (BP,1980) 38.307 0.01 46.703 0.00 44.909 0.00 44.658 0.00 
lmCD  (Pesaran, 2004) 2.671 0.00 3.966 0.00 3.689 0.00 3.650 0.00 
CD   (Pesaran, 2004) -1.996 0.02 -2.124 0.01 -1.569 0.05 -2.115 0.01 
adjLM (PUY, 2008) -1.139 0.873 -1.697 0.955 -0557 0.711 -1.404 0.920 
Notes: The lag number (pi) is determined as 1 in the model , , 1 , , ,
1
ip
i t i i i t i j i t j i t
j
y d y y u  

      . 
When we take CDLM1 and CDLM2 tests into account alternative hypotheses are accepted in level. 
That means there is the cross dependency among the country series. 
 
Table 9. Cross Dependency Test Results in the First Difference 
 Model with Constant Model with Constant and Trend 
 Fsi infgap fsi Infgap 
 Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
lmCD  (BP,1980) 10.401 0.00 42.746 0.00 32.503 0.05 43.857 0.00 
lmCD  (Pesaran, 2004) 2.994 0.00 3.356 0.00 1.775 0.03 3.527 0.00 
CD   (Pesaran, 2004) -1.732 0.04 -2.261 0.01 -1.914 0.02 -2.361 0.00 
adjLM (PUY, 2008) 0.421 0.337 4.898 0.00 0.050 0.480 4.132 0.00 
Notes: In the model , , 1 , , ,
1
ip
i t i i i t i j i t j i t
j
y d y y u  

      , the no. of lags (pi) is determined to be 1.  
When we take CDLM1 and CDLM2 tests into account alternative hypotheses are accepted in the first 
difference. That means there is cross dependency among the country series. 
 The second generation unit roots tests that can determine if the series are stationary for 
each country are the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Augmented Dickey-Fuller (SURADF) and 
the Cross Sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) tests. Hypotheses for the SURADF test: 
H0: Series have unit root and series are not stationary. 
H1: Series do not have unit root and series are stationary. 
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If the SURADF test statistics are smaller than the critical value, then the series of the related 
country is stationary. If the SURADF test statistics are greater than the critical value, the null 
hypothesis is accepted meaning that each series of the related country has an unstationary 
characteristic. According to the test results presented in the table below, it is certain that the FSI 
series are not stationary. On the other hand, the inflation gap variable results indicate that the series 
of the inflation gap for Peru, Colombia, Indonesia and Turkey have no unit root in level. 
 We also employ unit root tests taking structural breaks into account. One of them is ILT 
(2005). The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
H0: There is no structural breaks, there is a unit root. 
H1: There is a structural break, there is no unit root. 
In order to decide whether a series has a unit root test or not, we compare the test statistics and 
critical values. If the absolute value of test statistics is greater than the absolute value of the critical 
value, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, or vice versa. 
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Table 10. SURADF Unit Root Test Results 
  Constant    Constant and Trend  
 Lags SURADF t-stat 10%  Lags SURADF t-stat 10% 
FSI        
Peru 3 -1.8464 -5.2934  3 0.4288 -9.0704 
Mexico 1 -2.9723 -4.4894  1 -4.3189 -5.9277 
Colombia 1 -1.3544 -6.0218  1 -5.1585 -7.1708 
South Africa 1 -1.3408 -4.8003  1 -2.4121 -5.2360 
Indonesia 1 -1.5958 -5.0351  4 -4.7518 -8.3409 
Brazil 4 -4.6096 -5.9084  4 -3.3508 -7.8770 
Turkey 1 -2.1093 -5.0520  1 -5.3777 -10.3896 
Infgap        
Peru 2 -5.1327 -3.3964  2 -4.8552 -5.1883 
Mexico 2 -1.8135 -5.7867  2 -1.5465 -10.3664 
Colombia 1 -4.7453 -3.7797  1 -6.0052 -6.0030 
South Africa 3 -3.7248 -5.2006  3 -2.5365 -6.7687 
Indonesia 4 -5.3310 -0.4215  4 -4.2490 1.7890 
Brazil 1 -2.5864 -4.3802  1 -2.6777 -6.7733 
Turkey 4 -3.6511 0.4036  4 -4.3465 0.9388 
Notes: the maximum lag length is determined as 4 and the optimal lag length criteria is chosen as Schwarz 
information criteria. Critical values are obtained from the bootstrap method and the number of bootstraps 
is 100. 
  
 According to results for the financial stability index, the series have structural breaks 
during the post-crisis period. Although there might be numerous reasons for the breaks, the 
declaration of Bernanke in the second quarter of 2013 is one of the most important reasons for the 
breaks in the financial stability index via capital outflows. 
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Table 11. Im, Lee & Tieslau (2005) Panel Unit Root Test with Structural Breaks Results for Financial 
Stability Index 
 One break model  
 Level shift model: 
Break in constant  
Level and trend shift model: 
Break in constant and trend 
 
 
Lag LM-stat. Break   Lag 
Transformed  
LM-stat. Break  
 
Peru 4 -4.417** 2010Q3  4 -4.435** 2010Q3  
Mexico 0 -10.652*** 2014Q1  0 -5.710*** 2013Q2  
Colombia 3 -4.350** 2010Q3  3 -4.778*** 2013Q2  
South Africa 0 -5.972*** 2010Q3  0 -5.996*** 2010Q3  
Indonesia 0 -3.783* 2010Q3  0 -3.737* 2010Q3  
Brazil 0 -8.350*** 2014Q1  0 -11.184*** 2014Q1  
Turkey 0 -4.361** 2013Q2  0 -5.368*** 2014Q1  
Panel-LM  -15.704    -13.160   
p-value  0.00    0.00   
  Two breaks model  
Peru 0 -7.464*** 2013Q2 2014Q1 0 -14.084*** 2010Q3 2014Q2 
Mexico 0 -22.487*** 2013Q4 2015Q1 0 -7.462*** 2013Q2 2015Q1 
Colombia 0 -41.615*** 2014Q2 2015Q1 0 -5.593*** 2013Q2 2015Q2 
South Africa 0 -14.615*** 2010Q3 2015Q1 0 -.7.430*** 2010Q3 2015Q2 
Indonesia 0 -5.396*** 2013Q4 2015Q1 4 -5.738*** 2013Q4 2014Q4 
Brazil 0 -12.895*** 2013Q4 2014Q3 0 -8.607*** 2013Q2 2014Q1 
Turkey 0 -8.430*** 2014Q1 2014Q4 0 -6.686*** 2014Q1 2014Q4 
Panel-LM  -57.052    -20.816    
p-value  0.00    0.00   
*, **, and *** denote significance levels 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Critical values for individual 
statistics for one break model: -4.604 (1%); -3.950 (5%); -3.635 (10%) Critical values for individual 
statistics for two breaks model: -5.365 (1%); -4.661 (5%); -4.338 (10%). The maximum lag length is 
selected as four and the optimal lag length is identified via the “t-stat significance” approach. 
 
 The results for the inflation gap variable are presented in the following table. According to 
results there are breaks in the series of inflation gap. Similar to financial stability index series, 
break points are intensive in 2013. The declaration of Bernanke also effects the inflation 
performance of the economies. 
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Table 12. Im, Lee & Tieslau (2005) Panel Unit Root Test with Structural Breaks Results for Inflation Gap  
 One break model  
 Level shift model: 
Break in constant  
Level and trend shift model: 
Break in constant and trend 
 
 
Lag LM-stat. Break   Lag 
Transformed  
LM-stat. Break  
 
Peru 0 -5.674*** 2014Q4  0 -5.352*** 2013Q4  
Mexico 1 -7.188*** 2014Q4  1 -6.350*** 2014Q4  
Colombia 0 -5.900*** 2015Q2  0 -6.078*** 2014Q3  
South Africa 0 -11.223*** 2014Q1  0 -10.234*** 2014Q1  
Indonesia 0 -5.642*** 2014Q4  0 -5.508*** 2014Q4  
Brazil 1 -8.966*** 2014Q3  1 -6.919*** 2014Q3  
Turkey 0 -6.854*** 2015Q2  0 -6.854*** 2015Q2  
Panel-LM  -21.336    -16.698   
p-value  0.00    0.00   
  Two breaks model  
Peru 0 -39.106*** 2013Q2 2014Q2 0 -24.925*** 2013Q2 2015Q1 
Mexico 1 -10.618*** 2013Q2 2015Q1 1 -10.088*** 2013Q2 2015Q1 
Colombia 0 -51.811*** 2013Q4 2014Q3 1 -7.782*** 2013Q2 2014Q3 
South Africa 0 -15.670*** 2013Q2 2014Q1 0 -14.385*** 2013Q2 2014Q1 
Indonesia 0 -54.046*** 2013Q2 2014Q1 0 -5.320*** 2014Q1 2014Q4 
Brazil 0 -11.200*** 2014Q2 2015Q1 0 -11.990*** 2014Q1 2015Q2 
Turkey 0 -8.774*** 2013Q2 2014Q3 0 -7.262*** 2013Q2 2014Q3 
Panel-LM  -101.526    -37.018   
p-value  0.00    0.00   
*, **, and *** denote significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Critical values for individual 
statistics for one break model: -4.604 (1%); -3.950 (5%); -3.635 (10%) Critical values for individual 
statistics for two breaks model: -5.365 (1%); -4.661 (5%); -4.338 (10%). The maximum lag length is 
selected as four and the optimal lag length is identified via “t-stat significance” approach. 
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Table 13. Panel Co-integration Test Results 
  Constant Constant –Trend 
P
a
n
el
 –
te
st
s 
Panel   -Statistic -1.168 (0.878) -1.552 (0.939) 
Panel  -Statistic -0.309 (0.378) -1.672 (0.047)** 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.962 (0.167) -5.860 (0.00)*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic 0.624 (0.733) -2.656 (0.00)*** 
G
ro
u
p
-t
es
ts
 Group  -Statistic 0.370 (0.644) -0.214 (0.415) 
Group PP-Statistic (non-parametric) -0.784 (0.216) -7.585 (0.00)*** 
Group ADF-Statistic (non-parametric) 0.511 (0.695) -2.784 (0.00)*** 
 
Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999) 
Cointegration Tests 
1.691 (0.042)**  
 
Johansen-Fisher (1999) 
Cointegration Test 
22.09 (0.077)* 23.66 (0.050)* 
Notes: Lag length was selected based on the Schwarz information criterion.  ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level of significance, respectively. The null hypothesis is no co-integration. 
Bartlett as a spectral estimation and Newey-West as a bandwidths election were used. Test statistics are 
weighted statistics and probabilities were reported in parentheses.  Fisher statistics are based on the Trace 
test and the Johansen-Fisher test.  
 
 After we determine the unit root and structural breaks in the series, we analyze the co-
integration tests developed by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999) and Johansen-Fisher (1999). 
According to Kao’s (1999) and Pedroni (1999) residual co-integration test results there is evidence 
of co-integration among variables of interest. Additionally, Johansen - Fisher panel co-integration 
test results indicate the presence of one co-integration relationship. For both Models 3 and 4, 
Johansen co-integration tests show a co-integration relationship among variables of interest.4 
                                                          
4 Model 3 implies intercept (no trend) in co-integration equation and VAR., while Model 4 means intercept and trend 
in co-integration equation, but no trend in VAR.  
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When all the results are evaluated together it is concluded that there are several co-integration 
relationships between variables. Therefore, it is important to implement advanced panel data 
methodology to better understand the relation between variables. İn this regard, we employ panel 
causality tests in the rest of the section. 
 The pairwise panel causality test developed by Dumitrescu Hurlin (2012) tests causality in 
heterogenous panels. According to test results, there is no causality between the financial stability 
index and the inflation gap. 
 
Table 14. Pairwise Dumitrescu Hurlin panel causality test 
INFGAP does not Granger Cause FSI Statistic p-value 
W stat 2.456 
0.971 
Zbar stat -0.035 
FSI does not Granger Cause INFGAP   
W stat 1.952 
0.653 
Zbar stat -0.448 
Maximum lag number is set to three and optimal lags for each country is determined by the means of Akaike 
information criterion  
 
 In the following table, we present the results of the panel causality test developed by 
Emirmahmutoglu and Kose (2011). The panel causality test for heterogenous panels allows us to 
investigate the interaction between variables in both a single country and the group. According to 
results, it is certain that there is no causation linkage between variables in the group. Besides, there 
is no causation linkage between variables in any country except Colombia. Results for Colombia 
show that financial stability influences the inflation gap in the case of Colombia. 
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Table 15. Emirmahmutoğlu ve Köse panel Causality Test Results 
Country Lag fsi=>infgap  infgap=>fsi  
  Wald p-value Wald p-value 
Peru 2 0.478  0.787 1.863 0.393 
Mexico 1 1.540 0.214 0.296 0.585 
Colombia 2 5.847 0.053* 2.089 0.351 
South Africa 3 0.623 0.891 1.040 0.791 
Indonesia 1 1.025 0.311 0.755 0.384 
Brazil 3 5.505 0.138 4.992 0.172 
Turkey 3 2.331 0.506 1.070 0.784 
Fisher  17.28536 0.24190 11.40231 0.654182 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels 1%. 5% and 10% respectively. 
  
 The panel vector autoregression results confirm that there is no interaction between 
variables in the short run. The result is consistent with Emirmahmutoglu and Kose (2011) and 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) pairwise panel causality test results. On the other hand, different 
from short run analysis, there is a bi-directional causality between variables in the long run. Uni-
directional causality running from price stability to financial stability index is significant 
statistically in 1% level, uni-directional causality running from financial stability index to price 
stability is significant in 10% level. That means in the longer time periods, price stability would 
induce a healthier financial system and financial system health would allow a stable general price 
level in the economy. 
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Table 16. Panel VECM Causality Test Results 
 Short-run causality  Long-run causality 
  (fsi)  (infgap)   Ect(-1) 
 (fsi)  1.222571 (0.2689)   -0.017604 (0.00751)*** 
 (infgap) 0.298296 (0.5228)    -0.368715 (0.08546)* 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
3.4. Effectiveness of Policy Instruments on Policy Objectives, Time Series Analysis 
 In the second stage of the analysis, we investigate the impact of the policy rate on the 
financial stability index to understand how the inflation targeting regime influences the stability 
of the financial system. The lending rate and the reserve requirement ratio are normally used to 
control the financial system, but we will use them to test their impact on price stability. 
 In the first step, we employ each sector independently by using the times series analysis 
method and the vector autoregressive method (VAR). For each country, we build up a VAR model 
and we include the inflation gap and the financial stability index next to the policy instrument. 
 Before we get the results for the impulse response analysis, we test the lag length for each 
country. In the first level, we build up the model for policy rate and investigate the impact of policy 
rate on the financial stability index. We use the lag length criteria to determine the lag length and 
double check for an auto-correlation problem. According to analysis results, the lag length is four 
for Turkey and Mexico, two for Brazil, three for Colombia, and one for Indonesia, South Africa 
and Peru. 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Chart 1. Response of FSI to Policy Rate Shocks 
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 According to results, it is certain that there is no positive contribution of the policy rate 
which is employed to control price stability on financial stability. While an increase in the policy 
rate would reduce the inflation rate, it has no effect on the financial stability. This is contrary to 
the view that if price stability is achieved then financial stability occurs automatically. An increase 
in policy rate causes a reduction in the financial stability index in Turkey, Brazil and Colombia. 
Although it is possible to discuss theoretically, results are insignificant statistically. Similarly, an 
increase in policy rate increases the financial stability index in South Africa, Peru and Indonesia, 
but the results are insignificant statistically. Only results for Mexico show that policy rate increases 
induce a reduction in the financial stability index. That means in a possible increasing inflation 
environment, central bank’s policy rate intervention positively would induce a decrease in the 
financial stability index. That is why the central bank of Mexico should implement the instruments 
carefully not to imbalance another policy instruments. 
 In the second level, we build up the model for lending rate and investigate the impact of 
lending rate on price stability. We use lag length criteria to determine lag length and double check 
if there is an auto-correlation problem. According to analysis results, the lag length is two for 
Turkey, one for Brazil, Peru, South Africa and Indonesia, three for Colombia. 
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Chart 2. Response of INFLATION GAP to LENDING RATE Shock 
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 According to results, the lending rate has an impact on inflation gap for most of the 
economies. In the case of Turkey, a positive shock in lending rate would increase inflation gap. 
This result is statistically significant for four quarters. In the case of Columbia, the impact of the 
positive lending rate shock on the inflation gap is significant for six quarters and it would increase 
the gap between the target and actual inflation rates. For the case of Peru, the inflation gap variable 
responds to a positive shock in the lending rate positively. It is significant statistically during 
almost two quarters. For the case of Mexico, the inflation gap variable responds to a positive shock 
in the lending rate positively. It is significant statistically during three quarters. On the other hand, 
for the case of Brazil, the response of the inflation gap variable to the same shock is positive and 
statistically significant for only one month. Contrary these economies, the impact of the lending 
rate on the inflation gap is statistically insignificant in Indonesia and South Africa, although they 
have both positive responses. Considering the results, implementing lending rate as an instrument 
of financial stability objective has a negative impact on the price stability objective. 
 In the third level, we build up the model for the required reserve ratio and investigate the 
impact of the required reserve ratio on price stability. We use the lag length criteria to determine 
lag length and double check if there is an auto-correlation problem. According to analysis results, 
the lag length is four for Turkey and one for Brazil, Peru and Indonesia. 
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Chart 3. Response of INFLATION GAP to REQUIRED RESERVE RATIO Shock 
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 According to results, it is certain that the required reserve ratio has no meaningful impact 
in the case of Turkey, Brazil and Peru. Although the response of the inflation gap is negative in 
Turkey and Peru, it is not significant statistically. Similarly, in Brazil, the response of the inflation 
gap is positive, but it is statistically insignificant. Response of inflation to a positive shock in 
reserve requirements ratio is positive in Indonesia and statistically significant for only one month. 
Results imply that reserve requirements ratio has no impact on price stability in most of the 
countries. Indonesia is the only country where the inflation targeting regime could be affected 
negatively. But the response of inflation is weak and temporary. 
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3.5. Effectiveness of Policy Instruments on Policy Objectives, Panel Data Analysis 
 In the first step, we test the cross-section dependency in order to analyze unit root. If there 
is no cross-section dependency, first generation unit root tests are employed, otherwise second 
generation unit root tests are employed. To test the cross-section dependency, we employ Peseran 
(2004) CDLM, Breusch-Pagan CDLM1, Peseran (2004) CDLM2 test methods. If T>N, CDLM1 and 
CDLM2 test methods are employed and if N>T, CDLM test method is used. 
In a cross section dependency test; 
H0: There is no cross-section dependency, 
H1: There is cross section dependency. 
 
Table 17. Cross Section Dependency Test Results 
 INFGAP FSI POLRATE LENDING RRR 
lmCD  (BP, 1980) 44.428 
(0.00) 
21.727 
(0.00) 
7.544 
(0.273) 
11.349 
(0.07) - 
lmCD  (Pesaran, 2004) 11.093 
(0.00) 
4.540 
(0.00) 
0.446 
(0.328) 
1.544 
(0.06) - 
CD  (Pesaran, 2004) -2.610 
(0.00) 
-1.401 
(0.08) 
-1.783 
(0.03) 
-2.221 
(0.01) - 
adjLM (PUY, 2008) 2.146 
(0.01) 
6.635 
(0.00) 
7.779 
(0.00) 
10.029 
(0.00) - 
In the model , , 1 , , ,
1
ip
i t i i i t i j i t j i t
j
y d y y u  

       lag length (pi) is accepted as one.  
 
 The test results for required reserves ratio are statistically insignificant. So, it is not possible 
to report them. On the other hand, there is no cross-section dependency for the other variables. 
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 The SURADF unit root test results are reported in the following table. The test hypotheses 
are as follows: 
H0: Series has unit root and it is not stationary.  
H1: Series has no unit root and it is stationary.  
If the test statistics are smaller than critical values the series is stationary and alternative the 
hypothesis is valid for the related country. Otherwise the null hypothesis is accepted, and the series 
of the related country has a non-stationary characteristic.  
 
Table 18. SURADF Unit Root Test Results 
  Constant    Constant and Trend  
 Lags SURADF t-stat 10%  Lags SURADF t-stat 10% 
INFGAP        
Peru 1 -1.7486 -7.5392  2 -1.2197 -4.5532 
Indonesia 3 -3.1552 -5.1201  2 -3.4186 -4.5513 
Brazil 1 -2.2326 -3.8299  1 0.6276 -4.6590 
Turkey 1 -4.7707 -4.9112  1 -4.0159 -4.3231 
Mexico 1 -2.9723 -4.4894  1 -4.3189 -5.9277 
Colombia 1 -1.3544 -6.0218  1 -5.1585 -7.1708 
South Africa 1 -1.3408 -4.8003  1 -2.4121 -5.2360 
FSI        
Peru 2 -0.4769 -5.6559  3 3.2488 -4.5420 
Indonesia 3 0.6642 -4.8492  2 -1.4787 -7.1525 
Brazil 1 -3.5307 -4.0350  4 -6.6553 -0.1373 
Turkey 1 -1.6648 -5.1904  1 -1.8891 -7.2881 
Mexico 2 -1.8135 -5.7867  2 -1.5465 -10.3664 
Colombia 1 -4.7453 -3.7797  1 -6.0052 -6.0030 
South Africa 3 -3.7248 -5.2006  3 -2.5365 -6.7687 
POLRATE        
Peru 1 1.6293 -3.6314  4 -4.3326 0.8884 
Indonesia 4 -2.0219 -5.0013  4 -3.7258 0.9763 
Brazil 4 1.7361 -6.2895  4 -3.7470 -13.8142 
Mexico 1 -1.5958 -5.0351  4 -4.7518 -8.3409 
Colombia 4 -4.6096 -5.9084  4 -3.3508 -7.8770 
South Africa 1 -2.1093 -5.0520  1 -5.3777 -10.3896 
Turkey 4 -3.9089 -0.4036  4 2.6694 -0.1202 
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Table 18 continued 
LENDING        
Peru 4 -3.8661 -0.2729  4 -7.9495 1.3816 
Indonesia 3 -3.0715 -4.0355  4 -9.7112 -0.8239 
Brazil 4 -1.0882 -3.2737  4 -0.6876 -11.9655 
Mexico 4 -3.0876 -4.5878  4 -4.2490 1.7890 
Colombia 1 -1.6895 3.3966  1 -2.6777 -6.7733 
South Africa 4 -3.6225 -4.0258  4 -4.3465 0.9388 
Turkey 1 -1.7212 -3.3618  1 -2.6728 -6.5856 
The maximum lag length is selected as four and the optimal lag length is selected according to Schwarz 
information criteria. Critical values are obtained from a bootstrap process and the number of bootstraps is 
100. 
 According to results, the variable series are taken into account with their first difference. 
In light of these findings, we include all variables into vector autoregressive analysis in their first 
difference. While we take seven countries into account for impulse response analysis of policy rate 
and lending rate, we take four countries into account for impulse response analysis of required 
reserves ratio. These are Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia and Peru. The optimal lag length for the policy 
rate and lending rate analysis is three and it is one for required reserves ratio analysis. 
Chart 4. Impulse Response Analysis of Each Policy Instrument on Policy Objectives 
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Response of Inflation Gap to a Positive Shock in Reserve Requirements Rate 
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 According to impulse response analysis, the effect of a positive shock in policy rate on 
financial stability is positive. Theoretically the result would support the classical view. But it is 
statistically insignificant. The response of inflation gap to a positive shock in lending rate would 
be positive and the response is statistically significant for two months. The result means that a 
policy action to increase financial stability would increase the gap between target and actual 
inflation rate. So, financial stability actions may hurt the price stability objective. Lastly, the 
response of the inflation gap variable to a positive shock in required reserves ratio is slightly 
positive. Moreover, the sign of the response is statistically insignificant. 
 According to results, the monetary policy instrument which is used to stabilize the general 
price level does not affect the financial stability objective. On the other hand, the lending rate 
employed by the central bank to stabilize the financial system affects inflation gap positively and 
it is significant statistically. That means the financial stability objective influences the price 
stability objective negatively. Required reserves ratio have no impact on actual inflation rate. 
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4. Conclusion 
 Before the global financial crisis of 2008, financial stability wasn’t included in monetary 
policy objectives, but afterwards financial stability became a major concern of the central banks. 
Financial stability, according to convention wisdom, is automatically attained with price stability. 
The fact that many economies had stable price levels during the crisis period led many economists 
to argue against conventional wisdom.  
 This study investigates the interaction between price stability and financial stability for 
“Fragile Five” countries. In the first step, the causation linkage between price stability and 
financial stability indicators is investigated. In the second step, we analyze the effect of financial 
stability instruments, lending rate and required reserve ratio, on price stability. We then test the 
price stability instrument policy rate on financial stability. Empirical findings, in the first step, 
indicate that there is no meaningful relationship between policy objectives in the short run, while 
the relation between financial stability and price stability occurs in the longer time frequencies. 
However, the situation is not valid for all economies. In the second step, we measure the effects 
of monetary policy tools employed by the central bank of each of the Fragile Five countries. The 
findings from the analysis that investigates the effects of each policy instrument imply that the 
policy rate instrument implemented to achieve the inflation target does not affect the financial 
stability goal. Similarly, the reserve requirement ratio instrument to achieve the financial stability 
goal does not affect the price stability goal. On the other hand, results give some implication about 
the negative effects of the lending rate instrument on the inflation targeting objective.  
 This study contributes to the literature by investigating the effects of price stability on 
financial stability in developing countries with fragile financial systems and strong dependencies 
on foreign financial flows. It also adds in testing the validity of the Schwartz hypothesis which 
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claims that a monetary regime that produces aggregate price stability will, as a by-product, tend to 
promote stability of the financial system. Similar studies can provide guidance for the creation and 
improvement of policymaking processes.  
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